American Civil War Battle Summaries

ATLANTA, GA.
JULY 20TH, 1864 - SEPT. 2ND, 1864.

Atlanta, Ga., Siege of, July 20 to Sept. 2, 1864. Army
of the Cumberland, Army of the Tennessee, and Army of the
Ohio. The objectives points for the year 1864 were Richmond
and Atlanta-the head and heart of the Confederacy. Early in
March Gen. U. S. Grant was made lieutenant-general and
transferred to the immediate command of the Army of the
Potomac, Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman being at the same time placed
in command of the forces in the West. Sherman's new command
consisted of four departments: the Army of the Cumberland, at
Chattanooga, commanded by Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas ; the
Army of the Tennessee, at Huntsville, Ala., commanded by Maj.-
Gen. James B. McPherson; the Army of the Ohio, in East
Tennessee, commanded by Maj.-Gen. John M. Schofield, and the
Army of Arkansas, under the command of Maj.-Gen. Frederick
Steele. The last named was subsequently transferred to
Canby's trans-Mississippi division, and took no part in the
Atlanta campaign. The Army of the Cumberland was composed of
the 4th, 14th and 20th army corps, respectively commanded by
Maj.-Gens. O. O. Howard John M. Palmer and Joseph Hooker; the
cavalry corps of Brig.-Gen. Washington L. Elliott, and some
unattached troops. The 4th corps was made up of three
divisions, commanded by Maj.-Gen. David S Stanley, Brig.-Gen.
John Newton and Brig-Gen Thomas J. Wood and later in the
campaign an artillery brigade was organized and placed under
the command of Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. In the 14th corps were
three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig. Gen. R. W.
Johnson, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. Jefferson C. Davis, and the 3rd
by Brig.-Gen. Absalom Baird. In this corps was also an
artillery brigade, commanded by Maj. Charles Houghtaling. The
20th corps comprised three divisions, the 1st commanded by
Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. John W.
Geary, and the 3rd by Maj.-Gen. Daniel Butterfield. Maj. John
Reynolds commanded the artillery brigade of the 20th corps
after it was organized in July. The cavalry corps included
the three divisions commanded by Brig.Gens. Edward McCook,
Kenner Garrard and Judson Kilpatrick. The Army of the
Tennessee embraced the 15th, 16th and 17th army corps,
commanded by Maj.-Gens. John A. Logan, Grenville M. Dodge and
Frank P. Blair. Logan's corps included the divisions of Brig.-
Gens. Peter J. Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith and William Harrow.
In Dodge's corps were the divisions of Brig.-Gens. Thomas W.
Sweeny and James C. Veatch. The 17th corps was made up of the
two divisions commanded by Brig.-Gen. Mortimer D. Leggett and
Brig.-Gen. Walter Q. Gresham. The Army of the Ohio consisted
of the 23rd corps, which was composed of the three divisions
of infantry commanded by Brig.-Gens. Alvin P. Hovey, Henry M.
Judah and Jacob D. Cox and the cavalry division of Maj.-Gen.
George Stoneman. The effective strength of the army on May 1,
1864, was 98,797 men, with 254 pieces of artillery. At that
time the 17th corps was not with the main body. After it
joined on June 8 the effective strength was 112,819 men.

Opposed to this force was the Confederate army under the
command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. It was made up of
Hardee's corps, consisting of Cheatham's, Cleburne's and
Walker's divisions and the artillery under Col. Melancthon
Smith; Hood's (or Lee's) corps, consisting of the divisions of
Hindman, Stevenson and Stewart and the artillery under Col. R.
F. Beckham; Wheeler's cavalry corps, embracing Martin's,
Kelly's and Hume's divisions and Roddey, command, with the
artillery under Col. F. H. Robertson; Polk's corps, which
included Loring's, French's and Cantey's (or Walthall's)
divisions, the cavalry division of Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson,
and the 1st division of the Georgia state militia. In his
article in "Battles and Leaders," Johnston states his
effective forces as being 42,856 men, with 112 guns, but Maj.
E. C. Dawes, of the 53rd Ohio, who made an extended
investigation into the subject, estimates the Confederate
strength at Resaca as being at least 67,000 men with 168
cannon, and figures that Johnston had under his command
something over 84,000 men later in the campaign.

With a view of preventing Johnston from sending
reinforcements to Longstreet in East Tennessee, and also to
assist Sherman's expedition to Meridian, Miss., Thomas made a
demonstration against Dalton, Ga., in the latter part of
February, but the campaign against Atlanta really began with
the occupation of Tunnel Hill by the Union forces on the 7th
of May. Then followed engagements at Rocky Face Ridge, Mill
Creek Gap, Dug Gap, Dalton, Resaca, Lay's Ferry, Adairsville,
Cassville, New Hope Church, Pickett's Mills, Big Shanty, Brush
Mountain, Kolb's Farm, Kennesaw Mountain, Ruff's Station,
Smyrna and the Chattahoochee river, with almost constant
skirmishing as Johnston retired toward Atlanta. On July 17th
Sherman's entire army crossed the Chattahoochee, his advance
being within 8 miles of the city. Up to this time Johnston
had acted on the defensive and so well had he conducted his
campaign that it had taken Sherman nearly two and a half
months to advance a distance of 100 miles. During the winter
of 1863-64 Gen. Gilmer, Confederate chief engineer, had
strengthened Atlanta as a base for Johnston's army by
intrenching the city. About the middle of June Capt. Grant of
the engineers was instructed to strengthen these
fortifications, especially on the northern side, toward
Peachtree creek. Johnston had been promised by Gen. Maury at
Mobile a number of rifled guns for this portion of the works,
and Gov. Brown had promised 10,000 state troops to aid in the
defense of the city. Johnston's plan was to engage the Union
army while it was, divided in crossing Peachtree creek. If he
failed there he would fall back to the line of works
constructed by Grant, where he could hold on until the arrival
of the state troops, when he could sally out and attack either
flank of the Federal forces as opportunity offered. But he
was not permitted to carry out his plans. His defensive
campaign had not found favor with the Confederate authorities,
and on the very day the Union forces crossed the Chattahoochee
he received the following telegram from Adjt.-Gen. Cooper at
Richmond: "I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you
that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to
the vicinity of Atlanta, and express no confidence that you
can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the
command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you
will immediately turn over to General Hood."

The news of the change soon reached the Federal lines,
where it was received with general satisfaction. Knowing the
feeling of the Confederate government toward Johnston's
course, the new commander determined upon an aggressive
policy. His opportunity soon came. Schofield had crossed the
Chattahoochee at Phillips, ferry, near the mouth of Soap
creek, and moved against the Georgia railroad in the vicinity
of Decatur. McPherson had effected a crossing at Roswell and
moved to Schofield's left, striking the railroad between
Decatur and Stone Mountain where Garrard's cavalry and M. L.
Smith's division destroyed several miles of track. He then
effected a junction with Schofield and moved toward the city.
On the 19th Sherman ordered Thomas to hold his right near
Howell's mill on Peachtree creek and swing his left across the
stream to connect with Schofield. Davis, division made an
attempt to cross at the mill, but finding the enemy too strong
on the opposite bank moved farther down the stream, where he
crossed without serious resistance, though Dilworth's brigade
had a sharp skirmish with and repulsed a Confederate
detachment. Geary succeeded in crossing about half a mile
above the mill. Wood moved forward on the Buckhead road, but
found the bridge destroyed and a force strongly intrenched on
the high bank opposite. By resorting to a flank movement he
succeeded, after a stubborn fight, in gaining a footing on the
south side of the creek below the road. At dark that evening
Thomas had the heads of three columns on the south side of the
Peachtree and the remainder of his army in position to follow
early on the 20th. There was still a considerable gap between
Thomas and Schofield, and to remedy this Sherman ordered
Howard to extend his line to the left to connect with
Schofield. Stanley's division crossed the north fork of the
Peachtree above the Buckhead road and went into camp for the
night between the forks of the creek, ready to move toward
Schofield's line early on the following morning. Baird's
division of Palmer's corps crossed during the night and took
position on the left of Davis, who occupied the extreme right
of the line, and early the next morning Johnson crossed and
moved into position on the left of Baird. Hooker sent over
Williams, division to form on Geary's right, and Ward's
(formerly Butterfield's) was ordered to Geary's left. Wood's
division made a detour to join Stanley and Newton moved up on
the Buckhead road into the position vacated by Wood. The
general course of Peachtree creek is westwardly. Howell's
mill stood at the point where the Marietta road crossed the
creek and from there to Buckhead bridge the distance was about
a mile and a half up the stream. About half-way between the
two roads a small stream called Shoal creek flowed into the
Peachtree from the south, and a short distance east of the
Buckhead road was another stream known as Clear creek. On the
bank of Shoal creek, about a quarter of a mile from the mouth,
stood Collier's mill. Newton after relieving Wood, moved
forward to a position about half a mile south of the
Peachtree, his left thrown out toward Clear creek, with his
line commanding the cross road running to Collier's mill, and
threw up a barricade of rails and logs. In a hollow to his
right and rear lay Ward's division, while still farther to the
right beyond Shoal creek was Geary.

Hood was aware of the gap in the Federal line and planned
an assault on Thomas before Schofield and McPherson could come
to his support. The attack was ordered for 1 p. m. on the
20th, with Stewart's corps on the left, Hardee's in the center
and Cheatham's on the right. Wheeler's cavalry was sent to
hold Schofield and McPherson in check, Cheatham was instructed
to hold his left on the creek in order to keep between Thomas
and Schofield, and the other two corps were to be hurled
against Thomas. The advance was to be made by divisions in
echelon, beginning on Hardee's right, and when the Union lines
were forced back to the creek the Confederates were to turn to
the left and press down the creek toward the west, sweeping
everything before them. At the last minute it became
necessary to change the plan of battle to meet certain
contingencies. Schofield and McPherson had moved faster than
flood had expected, notwithstanding Wheeler's efforts to hold
them back. On the night of the 19th Schofield crossed the
south fork of the Peachtree and took up a position along
Peavine creek, almost parallel to Cheatham's line of
intrenchments. To prevent Schofield from forming a junction
with Thomas, Cheatham was directed to withdraw a division from
his left to meet Schofield, and Hardee and Stewart were
ordered to move to the right to close the space thus vacated.
This movement caused a delay, so that it was about 4 o'clock
before the attack was begun. The movement of the Confederates
to the right brought Hardee in front of Newton who bore the
brunt of the first assault. Without skirmishers Hardee
advanced with Bate on the right, Walker in the center, Maney
on the left and Cleburne in reserve. His first division
passed Newton's left flank near Clear creek and for a little
while it looked as though Newton would be swept from his
position. But Bradley's brigade, which was in reserve,
quickly formed and with the assistance of a well manned
battery repulsed the attack. Kimball's brigade, on the right
of the road, was forced to change front to meet a force that
was outflanking it. The movement was successfully executed
and just at this juncture the brigades of Wood, Harrison and
Coburn, of Ward's division, came up on Kimball's right. The
sudden appearance of these fresh troops threw the enemy into
confusion and he beat a precipitate retreat. In the meantime
the attack had been extended beyond Shoal creek toward the
Union right. Near Collier's mill was an angle between Ward
and Geary. When the enemy had advanced into this angle
Geary's batteries opened with canister at short range and at
the same time a fierce infantry fire was maintained both in
front and on the flank. The slaughter here was terrific.
After the fight Geary's fatigue parties buried over 400 of the
Confederate dead. Stewart sent in the divisions of Loring and
Walthall, holding French within easy supporting distance.
This part of the Confederate line was subjected to a heavy
enfilading fire and forced to retire with heavy losses.
Loring lost 1,062 men in a few minutes. Again and again the
Confederates rallied and advanced to the assault. But Thomas-
"The Rock of Chickamauga"-was there in person, directing the
movements of his men, all of whom had the utmost confidence in
their general and presented a front that was invincible.
Ward's batteries were placed in a position to sweep the Clear
creek valley, driving back Bate's column that was trying to
gain Newton's rear. The enemy's losses in the subsequent at
tacks were not so great as in the first charge but their
repulse was none the less decisive. The efforts to reform the
lines for another assault were continued until sunset, when
the attempt was abandoned and the enemy retired within his
works. The Federal loss at the battle of Peachtree creek in
killed, wounded and missing was 1,707. No official report of
the Confederate casualties was made. General Hooker's
estimate of their losses in front of the 20th corps was 4,400
in killed and wounded, and the total loss in killed, wounded
and missing was not far from 6,000. While the battle of
Peachtree creek was in progress Gresham's division forced
Wheeler's cavalry back across the Augusta road toward Bald
Hill. In this movement Gresham was severely wounded and
Brig.-Gen. Giles A. Smith was assigned to the command of the
division.

The 21st was spent by Thomas and Schofield in the
readjustment of their lines. Skirmish lines were advanced and
intrenched within a short distance of the enemy's works, and
the space between Howard and Logan was filled by Schofield's
troops. On the Union left McPherson was more aggressive.
Seeing that Bald Hill was the key point to the situation on
that part of the line he determined to possess it. The hill
was held by Cleburne's division, which had occupied and
intrenched it the night before. McPherson sent Force's
brigade of Leggett's division, supported by Giles A. Smith,
against Cleburne. Force advanced under cover of the hill
itself until within a short distance of the enemy's lines and
then made a dashing charge across the intervening open space
against the slight intrenchment before him. Cleburne's men
were veterans and met the charge with that bravery which had
distinguished them on other fields, but after a sharp combat
they were forced to yield. The hill, afterward known as
Leggett's hill, was promptly manned by artillery, well
supported by infantry, and a few shells were thrown into the
city.

Having failed in his attempt against Thomas, Hood now
turned his attention to McPherson. In his report he says:
"The position and demonstration of McPherson's army on the
right threatening my communications made it necessary to
abandon Atlanta or check his movements. Unwilling to abandon,
the following instructions were given on the morning of the
21st: The chief engineer was instructed to select a line of
defense immediately about Atlanta, the works already
constructed for the defense of the place being wholly useless
from their position; Stewart's and Cheatham's corps to take
position and construct works to defend the city, the former on
the left, the latter on the right. The artillery, under the
command of Brig.-Gen. Shoup, was massed on the extreme right.
Hardee was ordered to move with his corps during the night of
the 21st south on the McDonough road, crossing Intrenchment
creek at Cobb's mills, and to completely turn the left of
McPherson's army. This he was to do, even should it be
necessary to go to or beyond Decatur. Wheeler, with his
cavalry, was ordered to move on Hardee's right, both to attack
at daylight, or as soon thereafter as possible. As soon as
Hardee succeeded in forcing back the enemy's left, Cheatham
was to take up the movement from his right and continue to
force the whole from right to left down Peachtree creek,
Stewart in like manner to engage the enemy as soon as the
movement became general."

Such were Hood's plans for his sortie of the 22nd, but
again the unforeseen interposed to prevent its success.
Blair's corps, its right at Bald Hill, had a line of
intrenchments along the McDonough road which made it necessary
for Hardee to take a different route from the one laid down by
Hood, so that he was not in position to begin his attack until
about noon. At daybreak that morning the Confederate works in
front of Thomas and Schofield were found abandoned. Of this
situation Sherman says in his report: "I confess I thought the
enemy had resolved to give us Atlanta without further contest,
but General Johnston had been relieved of his command and
General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed resolved on, of
which the bold attack on our right was the index. Our
advancing ranks swept across the strong and well finished
parapets of the enemy and closed in upon Atlanta until we
occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about 2
miles radius, when we again found him occupying in force a
line of finished redoubts which had been prepared for more
than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta, and
we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts with
curtains, strengthened by rifle-trench, abatis and chevaux-
defrise."

In contracting the lines about the city Dodge's corps
(the 16th) was thrown somewhat to the rear by the 15th corps
connecting with Schofield's right near the Howard house where
Sherman had his headquarters. Dodge was therefore ordered to
move to McPherson's left flank to strengthen and extend the
line in that direction. About noon the two divisions of
Dodge's corps were marching by fours in a long column to the
new position. Their line of march was nearly parallel to
Hardee's line of battle, consisting of Bate's and Walker's
divisions, concealed in the timber on the left. The first
intimation Dodge had of the presence of an enemy came with a
few straggling shots from the Confederate skirmishers. All
Dodge had to do was to face his veterans to the left and they
were in good line of battle on ground well calculated for
defense. Thus the engagement was begun on different ground
and with a different body of troops from what Hood intended or
Hardee expected. When the corps halted and faced to the left
Fuller's (formerly Veatch's) division was on the right and
Sweeny's on the left. In front was an open field over which
the enemy must advance. Fuller received the brunt of the
first attack, but it was handsomely repulsed. Walker's and
the 14th Ohio batteries were wheeled into position and these,
with the unerring infantry fire, checked every attempt to
cross the field, each time driving back the enemy with heavy
losses. Some idea of the carnage at this part of the field
may be gained from the statement that 13 of Walker's men were
found dead in one corner of a rail fence behind which the line
was formed. In one of these charges Gen. Walker rode out of
the woods, swinging his hat to cheer forward his men, and a
moment later was shot from his horse, dying almost instantly.
While the line was in some confusion Fuller made a headlong
charge and captured a number of prisoners, including the
colonel and adjutant of the 66th Ga. McPherson was in
consultation with Blair and Logan near the railroad when the
sound of the firing was heard, and hurried to the scene of
action. Noticing that a considerable gap existed between
Dodge's right and Blair's left, he sent orders to Logan to
push forward a brigade to close up the line. A short time
served to satisfy McPherson that Dodge could hold his position
and he started back to Blair. Just at this juncture
Cleburne's skirmishers were advancing into the gap above
mentioned. They called to McPherson to surrender, but instead
of obeying the summons he lifted his hat, as if in salute, and
wheeled his horse to gallop away. His action drew forth a
volley and he fell mortally wounded. As soon as the news
reached Sherman he assigned Logan to the temporary command of
the Army of the Tennessee. The sound of the volley that
killed McPherson told Fuller that the enemy was advancing on
his right and he threw forward the 64th Ill., armed with the
Henry repeating rifles, to protect his flank. This regiment
met Cleburne's skirmishers with such a galling fire that they
fell back with a loss of several in killed and wounded and
some 40 prisoners. Upon one of the prisoners was found
McPherson's effects, including an important despatch to
Sherman, and the body of the dead general was soon afterward
recovered.

Almost immediately after the fall of McPherson the
divisions of Cleburne and Maney emerged from the timber on the
right of Dodge and under the protection of a heavy artillery
fire from the ridge in their rear advanced in three columns
against the left and rear of the 17th corps. They struck
Blair's left flank, fronting west, then swung through the gap
and seized the works constructed by Leggett and Smith in their
advance on Bald Hill the day before. In this movement the
16th Iowa, 245 men, on Blair's extreme left was cut off and
captured. On moved the Confederate advance until it reached
the foot of the hill and even began the ascent to attack
Leggett's works on the summit. Here the tide of battle was
turned. Smith's division leaped over their works and began to
pour in a deadly fire from the other side. Wangelin's
brigade, which Logan had sent in response to McPherson's last
order to occupy the gap, arrived and opened fire on the
enemy's flank. This gave Blair an opportunity to change front
and form a new line, by which arrangement the Confederates
were forced back. Hood watched the movement from a salient in
the city's fortifications, and about 3 p. m., when he saw
Hardee's attack had driven Blair's left back far enough to
attack the hill from the south, ordered Cheatham's corps and
the state troops under G. W. Smith to move against the Union
position from the Atlanta side. Here Col. Jones, of the 53rd
Ohio, with two regiments of M. L. Smith's division and two
guns of Battery A, 1st Ill. artillery, occupied a position on
a hill about half a mile in advance of the main line. Near
his position the railroad ran through a deep cut and close by
stood a large house of which the enemy could take advantage to
cover his advance along the railroad. Jones wanted to burn
the house but failed to get permission to do so. Cheatham
sent forward Manigault's brigade to occupy it, while the main
body of the corps poured through the cut and struck Jones on
the flank, throwing his line into disorder. The two guns were
spiked, however, before they fell into the hands of the enemy.

About 800 yards in advance of the 15th corps was Battery
H (De Gress'), 1st Ill. light artillery, composed of 20-
pounder Parrott guns and occupying the works evacuated by the
enemy on the night of the 21st. The battery, practically
unsupported, was charged about 4 o'clock. The attack in front
was repulsed, but the enemy gained the rear, and De Gress,
seeing that capture was imminent, spiked the guns and withdrew
his men. The guns were soon afterward recaptured, unspiked
and fired a few rounds after the retreating enemy. This part
of the engagement was witnessed by Sherman from his position
near the Howard house and he ordered Schofield to mass his
artillery there and open a cross fire on Cheatham as he
advanced toward the hill. At the same time the 1st division
of the 15th corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. C. R. Woods, and
Mersey's brigade of Sweeny's division moved forward and
attacked Cheatham on flank and rear, checking his advance.
The whole 15th corps now rallied and by a counter charge drove
Cheatham in confusion from the field recapturing De Gress,
guns. This virtually ended the battle. Though several
subsequent attacks were made they only served to increase the
Confederate losses without giving them any advantage. Hardee
and Cheatham were operating on lines nearly at a right angle
and several miles apart. Had they attacked with vigor at the
same moment the result might have been different. Fortunately
for Blair who occupied the hill for which the enemy was
contending, the assaults were so disconnected that he always
had time to change front to meet each one when it came.

One thing that made it comparatively easy for Hardee to
gain Blair's flank and rear was the fact that Sherman had sent
Garrard's cavalry on the 21st to Covington to destroy the
Georgia railroad. Had the cavalry been with the left wing it
is quite probable that some scouting party would have
discovered the movement in time to check it, or at least to
have given a different turn to the battle.

At Decatur was Sprague's brigade of Fuller's division
guarding a train. About the time that Hardee began his attack
two divisions of Wheeler's cavalry made a descent upon Sprague
in an endeavor to capture the train. Sprague disposed his
force in such a way as to cover the withdrawal of the train
and put up a gallant resistance to a vastly superior force.
Reilly's brigade of Sweeny's division came to his assistance
and Wheeler was repulsed with a loss estimated at from 500 to
Sprague lost 242 men, most of whom were evidently captured, as
Wheeler reported about 225 prisoners.

Gen. J. D. Cox reports the Union losses in the battle of
the 22nd at 3,521 in killed, wounded and missing. Full
returns of the Confederate casualties are not available, but
Logan estimated them at 10,000. His command captured 5,000
stand of small arms, 18 stand of colors and 1,107 prisoners.
The total number of prisoners taken by the Union army was
about 2,000. Walker's division lost so heavily that the
remnants of its brigades were assigned to other commands.

Hood made another sortie on July 28, at Ezra Church
(q. v.). After that Sherman settled down to a siege, with
occasional cavalry raids against the railroad communications
south of the city. (See McCook's, Stoneman's and Kilpatrick's
Raids.) These expeditions having failed to destroy the
railroads, Sherman decided to intrench the 20th corps, now
commanded by Maj.-Gen. H. W. Slocum, at the railroad bridge
over the Chattahoochee and at Pace's and Turner's ferries, and
move the rest of his army to the south of Atlanta. This
movement began on Aug. 25. The 4th corps was relieved by
Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, and covered the withdrawal of
the 20th corps to the river. The next day the 4th and 14th
corps were massed on Utoy creek, and by the evening of the
27th the entire army except Slocum's corps was between Atlanta
and Sandtown. Hood had unconsciously played into Sherman's
hands by sending Wheeler with about 10,000 cavalry to cut the
Western & Atlantic railroad in the rear of the Union army,
thus weakening the Confederate forces in the field where
Sherman was now operating. On the night of the 28th Thomas
was at Red Oak a station on the West Point railroad Howard,
with the Army of the Tennessee, was at Fairburn, and Schofield
was near Mt. Gilead church, about 4 miles east of Thomas.
Hood sent out Hardee's and S. D. Lee's corps on the 30th to
check Sherman's movements and save the railroads if possible.
During the next few days skirmishes occurred at Red Oak, Rough
and Ready Morrow's mill, Mud creek and some other places; the
battle of Jonesboro was fought on Aug. 31, and Sept. 1, and
the fighting continued around Lovejoy's Station until Sept. 5.
In the end the enemy was beaten at every point, for on the
night of the 31st the Federals were in full possession of the
railroads. Upon learning this Hood realized that further
resistance was useless, and at 5 p. m. on Sept. 1, the
evacuation of the city was begun. During the night heavy
explosions were heard by Sherman's army, 20 miles south,
caused by blowing up their stores and magazines, and the next
morning it was discovered that the Confederate force at
Jonesboro had been withdrawn during the night.

In the meantime Slocum's command had been engaged in
constructing works at the railroad bridge and ferries, the 1st
division being at the bridge, the 2nd at Pace's ferry and the
3rd at Turner's. On Aug. 27, French's division, with 4 pieces
of artillery, came out and made a spirited attack on Slocum's
position, but it was handsomely repulsed with considerable
loss to the enemy and very slight loss to the Union forces.
The explosions on the night of Sept. 1, were heard in Slocum's
camp, and early the next morning he sent out adetachment of
the 2nd brigade, Ward's division, under Col. John Coburn, to
make a reconnaissance in the direction of the city and learn
the cause of the explosions. Coburn reached the old line of
the Confederate works and found it abandoned. In the suburbs
of the city he was met by Mayor Calhoun, with a committee of
citizens bearing a flag of truce. The mayor formally
surrendered the city and about 10 a. m. Ward's division
marched in and took possession, the remainder of Slocum's
corps following later. The Army of the Cumberland reached the
city on the 8th and took position in the works around it to
guard against any attempt to retake it. Sherman ordered all
families of Confederate soldiers to move southward within five
days, and all citizens of the north, not connected with the
army, to move northward, as the city was required purely for
military purposes. When the march to the sea was commenced
the torch was applied to all buildings except churches and
dwellings, but as the work was somewhat indiscriminately done
many buildings of the exempted classes were consumed.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 5

PETERSBURG, VA
JUNE 15TH, 1864 - APRIL 2ND, 1865

Petersburg, Va., June 15, 1864, to April 2, 1865. Army
of the Potomac and Army of the James. When the Army of the
Potomac began the campaign from the Rapidan to the James on
May 4, 1864, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was
directed to move against Richmond by the south bank of the
James river, and Gen. Hunter was to move up the Shenandoah
Valley, "destroying, as far as practicable, railroads that
could be used as lines of supplies to the enemy, and also the
James river and the Kanawha canal." After the battle of Cold
Harbor on June 3, Grant resolved to transfer the field of
operations to the south side of the James, and on the 5th he
sent a despatch to Gen. Halleck, chief of staff, in which he
stated: "My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if
possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of
communication on the north side of the James river to transfer
the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or
follow him south if he should retreat. * * * Once on the south
side of the James river, I can cut off all sources of supply
to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter
succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also.
Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to
destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the
river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can." Grant
had now adopted practically the same plan that had been
proposed by McClellan two years before. In June, 1862,
McClellan said: "The superiority of the James river route as a
line of attack and supply is too obvious to need exposition,"
and again in August, when the authorities in Washington were
needlessly alarmed for the safety of the national capital, he
telegraphed Gen. Halleck: "Here is the true defense of
Washington. It is here on the banks of the James, that the
fate of the Union should be decided." In view of the final
success of the army under Grant these words are prophetic.

The siege of Petersburg was also the siege of Richmond,
for with the fall of the former the latter was doomed. From
Richmond the James river flows south in almost a straight line
for 10 miles, when it turns toward the southeast and after a
sinuous course receives the Appomattox at City Point.
Petersburg is located on the Appomattox, 10 miles above its
mouth and 22 miles south of Richmond. The two cities were
connected by the Richmond & Petersburg railway. From
Petersburg the South Side railroad ran west along the bank of
the Appomattox to Lynchburg; the Weldon railroad ran south and
the Norfolk southeast. A short line also connected Petersburg
with City Point. Directly across the James from Richmond was
the village of Manchester, from which the Richmond & Danville
railroad ran west along the south bank of the James river,
while along the north bank of that stream was the Kanawha
canal, mentioned by Grant in his despatch to Halleck. To cut
these lines of communication was the first object of the
Federal commander. About half way between Petersburg and City
Point are the Point of Rocks and Broadway landing on the
Appomattox. From this point to the Dutch Gap bend on the
James the distance in a straight line is about 3 miles. The
peninsula enclosed by the two rivers below this line is known
as Bermuda Hundred, which had been occupied by Butler early in
May and a line of works constructed across the neck of the
peninsula. This position was a strong one for defense, but
Gen. Beauregard, commanding the defenses of Petersburg, threw
up a line of works immediately in Butler's front, thus
preventing his further advance and bottling him up on the
peninsula, where he remained until the Army of the Potomac
moved to the south side of the James. On June 9, Kautz
charged and carried a portion of the Petersburg works, but not
being supported by the infantry was unable to hold them,
though he brought out 40 prisoners and 1 piece of artillery
when he withdrew.

The withdrawal of troops from Cold Harbor began on the
1Oth. Shortly after dark on the 12th the 18th corps, the last
to leave the trenches, took up the march to White House
landing on the Pamunkey river, where the men were embarked on
transports, and by sunset on the 14th the corps joined Butler
at Bermuda Hundred, near the junction of the James and
Appomattox rivers. The other corps crossed the Chickahominy
and marched across the country, striking the James river in
the vicinity of Malvern hill. By the 20th of June Grant had
about 110,000 men in front of the Petersburg and Richmond
intrenchments. His forces were organized as follows: The Army
of the Potomac, Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, commanding,
consisted of the 2nd 5th, 6th and 9th corps of infantry and
the cavalry corps. The 2nd corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen.
Winfield S. Hancock and was composed of three divisions, the
first under command of Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, the 2nd
under Maj.-Gen. John Gibbon, and the 3rd under Maj.-Gen. David
B. Birney. The 5th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gouverneur
K. Warren, embraced four divisions, respectively commanded by
Brig.-Gens. Charles Griffin, Romeyn B. Ayres, Samuel W.
Crawford and Lysander Cutler. The 6th corps, Maj.-Gen.
Horatio G. Wright commanding, included three divisions, the
1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell, the 2nd by
Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty, and the 3rd by Brig.-Gen. James B.
Ricketts. Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was in command of the
9th corps. which was composed of four divisions respectively
commanded by Brig.-Gens. James H. Ledlie, Robert H. Potter,
Orlando B. Willcox and Edward Ferrero, the last named being
composed of colored troops. The cavalry corps was under
command of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, and was made up of
three divisions, the 1st commanded by Brig.-Gen. Alfred T. A.
Torbert, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. David McM. Gregg, and the 3rd
by Brig.-Gen. James H. Wilson. With the 2nd corps was the
artillery brigade of Col. John C. Tidball, Col. Charles S.
Wainwright commanded the artillery brigade of the 5th corps,
and Col. Charles H. Tompkins of the 6th, while the artillery
of the 9th was distributed among the several divisions. Capt.
James M. Robertson's brigade of horse artillery was attached
to Sheridan's command. The Army of the James, Maj.-Gen.
Benjamin F. Butler commanding, was made up of the 1Oth. and
18th infantry corps, the cavalry division under Brig. Gen.
August V. Kautz, the siege artillery under Col. Henry L Abbot,
and the naval brigade under Brig.-Gen. Charles K. Graham. The
1Oth. corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. William H. T. Brooks,
included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. Alfred
H. Terry, John W. Turner and Orris K. Ferry. The 18th corps,
commanded by Maj.-Gen. William F. Smith, embraced the three
divisions under Brig.-Gens. George J. Stannard, John H.
Martindale and Edward W. Hinks. In addition to the regular
organizations named there were some unattached troops.

Early on the morning of June 13, Lee discovered that the
Federal troops in his front had been withdrawn, and
immediately put his own army in motion for the Richmond and
Petersburg intrenchmeets. The Confederate works about the two
cities are thus described by Hotchkiss in the Virginia volume
of the Confederate Military History: "At this time,
Beauregard's left rested on the navigable Appomattox, about
one mile north of east from Petersburg. * * * On his right,
Anderson, with the First corps, extended the Confederate line
for some 3 miles to the southward, in front of Petersburg,
crossing the Norfolk & Petersburg railroad in the vicinity of
the Jerusalem plank road, thence westward for some 2 miles;
the Third corps, under A. P. Hill, extended the Confederate
right, on the south of Petersburg, to the Weldon & Petersburg
railroad. Pickett's division took up the line on the west
side of the Appomattox and extended it north to the James, at
the big bend opposite Dutch gap. The fortifications on the
north of the James from Chaffin's bluff northward, along the
front of Richmond, were held by batteries and by local troops
in command of Lieut.-Gen. R. S. Ewell. Subsequently the
Confederate works were extended to the southwest of Petersburg
for more than 10 miles to beyond Hatcher's run, until Lee's
line of defensive works, consisting of forts and redoubts
connected by breastworks and strengthened by all means known
to the art of war, extended for nearly 40 miles." According
to the same authority, "Lee had, in his 40-mile line, for the
defense of Richmond and Petersburg, some 54,000 men, the
remaining veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia, and of
the department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia,
Beauregard's army." From official sources it is learned that
on June 30, Lee's forces numbered 54,751 men, which was
gradually increased until on December 20, he had 66,533.
During the same period the Union army had lost in killed,
wounded and missing 47,554 men, but recruits had been brought
in until on Dec. 20, Grant had 110,364 men of all arms in
front of the Confederate works.

About 4 a.m. on June 15, Smith's corps and Kautz's
cavalry left Broadway landing for an assault on Beauregard's
works. Kautz soon met the Confederate skirmishers and at
Baylor's farm about 4 miles from Petersburg, a force of
infantry and artillery was found occupying a line of rifle-
pits. Hinks' division of colored troops made a vigorous
attack, dislodged the enemy and captured 1 piece of artillery.
Smith then advanced about a mile and a half to the Jordan
farm, where his entire front was subjected to an artillery
fire that drove the Union batteries from their position. Some
delay was incurred in reconnoitering, but at 7 p. m. the
divisions of Brooks and Hinks pushed forward and carried the
works, capturing over 200 prisoners, 4 guns, with horses,
caissons and ammunition, several stands of colors and the
intrenching tools. About the same time Martindale's division
carried the works between Jordan's house and the Appomattox,
capturing 2 pieces of artillery and equipments complete.
Hancock was directed on the evening of the 18th to hold his
corps in readiness to move, but he was delayed in waiting or
rations from City Point until 10:30 a.m. on the 15th when the
command moved without the rations. Owing to an incorrect map
he was unable to join Smith until after the action at Jordan's
was over. At 8 o'clock that evening Burnside started the 9th
corps to reinforce Smith and Hancock, and at 10 o'clock the
next morning his command went into position on Hancock's left.
Hancock was placed in command of all the troops and ordered to
make a general assault at 6 p.m. Before that hour Egan's
brigade of Birney's division assaulted and carried a redoubt,
known as redan No. 12, on Birney's left. In the attack at 6
o'clock redans Nos. 4, 13 and 14, with their connecting lines
of breastworks, were carried, but with considerable loss to
the assailants. At dawn on the 17th Potter's division
surprised the enemy in the works on the ridge near the Shand
house, captured 4 guns, 5 stands of colors, 600 prisoners and
1,50O stands of small arms. This was accomplished without a
shot being fired, the bayonet alone being used. The
Confederates were asleep with their arms in their hands, but
Potter's men moved so quietly, and at the same time so
swiftly, that they were over the works before the alarm could
be given. Those captured surrendered without resistance and
the others fled precipitately to an intrenched position along
the west side of Harrison's creek. Later in the day this line
was attacked by Willcox, but owing to a heavy enfilading fire
of artillery from the left, and the lack of proper support,
the assault was repulsed. Hartranft's brigade went into this
action with 1,890 men, of whom but 1,050 came back.

In the meantime Warren's corps had come up and taken
position on the left of Burnside. From prisoners Meade
learned the character of Beauregard's intrenchments and the
strength of his force, and ordered an assault by the whole
line to be made at daylight on the morning of the 18th, hoping
to carry the works before Lee could send reinforcements. When
the line advanced on the morning of the 18th it was found that
the enemy had evacuated the trenches held the day before and
now occupied a new line some distance farther back toward the
city of Petersburg. It was also discovered that Field's and
Kershaw's divisions had arrived during the night and were
already in position to meet the assault. On account of the
change in the enemy's position and the nature of the ground
over which the Federal troops had to advance, the attack was
postponed until 12 o'clock. The 2nd corps then made two
attacks on the right of the Prince George Court House road,
but both were repulsed. Burnside encountered some difficulty
in driving the Confederates from the railroad cut, but finally
succeeded and established his corps within a hundred yards of
the enemy's main line. Warren's assault was also
unsuccessful, though some of Griffin's men fell within 20 feet
of the enemy's works. Martindale's division carried a line of
rifle-pits, but made no attack on the main line. The
positions gained by the several commands were then intrenched
"and the siege of Petersburg was begun in earnest. From that
time until the fall of the city on April 2, 1865, there was
almost daily skirmishing at some point along the lines in
front of Petersburg, with more serious engagements on the
Jerusalem plank road, at Deep Bottom, long the Weldon, South
Side and Danville railroads, Reams' Station, Yellow Tavern,
Globe Tavern, Dinwiddie Court. House, Fort Harrison,
Chaffin's farm, Fair Oaks, Hatcher's run, Five Forks, Sailor's
creek, and a number of minor skirmishes, each of which is
herein treated under the proper head.

In Potter's division of the 9th corps was the 48th Pa., a
Regiment made up chiefly of miners from Schuylkill county and
commanded by Lieut.-Col. Henry Pleasants, who was a practical
mining engineer. After the assault of the 18th the men of
this regiment began discussing the feasibility of running a
mine under the enemy's works, and the plan was finally
proposed by Pleasants to Burnside, who gave the project his
unqualified approval and gained Meade's consent to it. The
portion of the works to be mined was known as Elliott's
salient, being occupied by Elliott's brigade of Bushrod
Johnson's division and was near the center of the line on the
east side of the city. With no tools but the pick and shovel
the Pennsylvanians excavated a main gallery 522 feet in length
with lateral galleries 37 and 38 feet long running under and
nearly parallel to the enemy's works, the earth taken from the
tunnel being carried out in cracker boxes. The work was
commenced on June 25, and on July 27 the mine was charged with
8,000 pounds of powder which was placed in eight magazines of
1,000 pounds each. On the 26th Burnside reported his plan for
an assault to follow immediately upon the explosion of the
mine. This plan contemplated the placing of Ferrero's
division in the advance, because his other divisions had been
under a heavy fire, day and night, for more than a month,
while the colored troops had been held as a reserve. This
selection was not approved by Meade and Grant, partly for the
reason that it might be charged they were willing to sacrifice
the negro soldiers by pushing them forward and partly because
Ferrero's division had never been in close contact with the
enemy and it was not known how they would conduct themselves
in such an emergency, though the men had been drilling for
several weeks for the work, and were not only willing but
anxious for the undertaking. A division was then selected by
lot, and it fell to Gen. Ledlie to lead the assault. This was
Burnside's weakest division and was commanded by a man whom
Gen. Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff, characterizes as "an
officer whose total unfitness for such a duty ought to have
been known to Gen. Burnside, though it is not possible that it
could have been. It was not known to Gen. Meade."

On the 29th an order was issued from headquarters
providing that "At half past three in the morning of the 30th,
Maj.-Gen. Burnside will spring his mine, and his assaulting
columns will immediately move rapidly upon the breach, seize
the crest in the rear and effect a lodgment there. He will be
followed by Maj.-Gen. Ord (now in command of the 18th corps),
who will support him on the right, directing his movement to
the crest indicated, and by Maj.-Gen. Warren who will support
him on the left. Upon the explosion of the mine the artillery
of all kinds in battery will open upon those points of the
enemy's works whose fire covers the ground over which our
columns must move, care being taken to avoid impeding the
progress of our troops. Special instructions respecting the
direction of the fire will be issued through the Chief of
Artillery."

At the appointed time Ledlie's division was in position
in two lines, Marshall's brigade in front and Bartlett's in
the rear, ready to charge into the breach the moment the mine
was sprung. Four o'clock came and still no explosion.
Officers and men who had been in a state of feverish
expectancy since shortly after midnight, began to grow
restless. An officer was sent to Burnside to inquire the
cause of the delay, and it was learned that the fuse had died
out Lieut. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees volunteered to
enter the gallery and reignite the fuse. Their efforts were
crowned with success though they had barely emerged from the
mouth of the mine at 4:45 when the explosion took place. A
solid mass of earth, mingled with timbers, dismantled cannon
and human beings, rose 200 feet in the air, and where
Elliott's salient had stood was a ragged crater 170 feet long,
60 wide and 30 feet deep, filled with dust and debris.
Immediately the Federal artillery-about 160 guns and mortars-
opened fire and as soon as the dust had cleared away
Marshall's line advanced closely followed by Bartlett's, but
the men could not resist the temptation to crowd forward to
look into the hole, and the two brigades became hopelessly
mixed. When the explosion occurred the Confederates hurried
away from the intrenchments for 200 or 300 yards on either
side of the mine, but the confusion of Ledlie's men and the
delay in restoring something like order gave the enemy time to
recover from his bewilderment, so that when the Union troops
attempted to cross the crater they were met by a fire of
musketry, straggling at first but increasing in effectiveness
until at the end of half an hour the two brigades were huddled
in a confused mass in the hole, unable to advance or withdraw.
Gen. Humphreys says: "Gen. Ledlie did not accompany, much less
lead, his division. He remained, according to the testimony
before the Court of Inquiry that followed, in a bomb-proof
about 50 yards inside our intrenchments, from which he could
see nothing that was going on. He could not have given the
instructions he received to his brigade commanders. Had the
division advanced in column of attack, led by a resolute,
intelligent commander, it would have gained the crest in
fifteen minutes after the explosion, and before any serious
opposition could have been made to it."

Willcox sent in part of a brigade on the left of the
mine, halting the remainder of his command until Ledlie's men
should advance. He was criticized by the court of inquiry for
not making efforts "commensurate with the occasion to carry
out Gen. Burnside's order to advance to Cemetery Hill."
Ferrero moved in the rear of Willcox and upon reaching the
most advanced line of the Federal works was compelled to halt
on account of other troops occupying the position assigned to
him. After some delay he was ordered to advance and carry the
crest beyond the crater and was moving forward for that
purpose when he was directed to halt. All seemed to be
confusion, for in a little while the order to advance was
renewed. By this time the enemy had strengthened his position
on the hill and when Ferrero tried to carry it he failed. His
colored troops established their valor, however, as in his
report Ferrero says : "They were repulsed, but veterans could
hardly have stood the fire to which they were exposed." At
6:30 orders were again sent to the division commanders not to
halt at the works, but to advance at once to the crest without
waiting for mutual support. Potter had moved his division
forward by the flank soon after Ledlie began his advance.
Upon reaching the vicinity of the mine Griffin's brigade
turned to the right, took possession of the intrenchments
which the Confederates had abandoned and began an attack upon
Elliott's troops which were forced back after a long and
severe contest. The other brigade attacked on the right of
Griffin but was repulsed. The support of Ord and Warren did
not come up to the expectations and at 9:15, after four hours
of desultory fighting, Burnside received a peremptory order to
withdraw his troops from the enemy's lines and cease offensive
operations. This order was sent into the crater with
instructions to the brigade commanders to consult and
determine as to the time and manner of retiring. They sent
back a request that a heavy fire of artillery and infantry
should be opened to cover the withdrawal, but before the
messenger reached Burnside the enemy made another attack and
the men fell back in some disorder,.leaving the wounded to
fall into the hands of the Confederates. The Union loss on
the 30th was 419 killed, 1,679 wounded and 1,910 missing.
Marshall and Bartlett were both captured and 23 regimental
commanders were reported either killed, wounded or missing.
On the Confederate side the loss in Elliott's brigade was 677,
and as Weisinger's brigade lost about as heavily the total
casualties among the enemy numbered probably not far from
1,000, most of whom were killed or wounded, as but few
prisoners were taken by the Federals.

On July 5, Gen. Early, commanding the Confederate forces
in the Shenandoah valley, crossed the Potomac near
Shepherdstown and moved toward Washington, hoping thereby to
compel Grant to withdraw troops from in front of Richmond and
Petersburg for the defense of the national capital and thus
giving Lee an opportunity to once more assume the offensive.
Grant did send Wright with the 6th corps to Washington and
this corps was not with the Army of the Potomac again until
the early part of December. Soon after the mine explosion Lee
felt that he could reduce his force at Petersburg and sent
Kershaw's division to reinforce Early in the valley. Grant
met this movement by sending Sheridan with two divisions of
cavalry early in August to operate against Early. After the
failure of Burnside's mine no more assaults were made on the
Confederate fortifications, the Union army conducting the
siege by regular approaches, raids against the railroads and
various movements by detachments. A few days after the battle
of Hatcher's run (Oct. 27,) the army went into winter quarters
and from that time until the next spring the operations were
confined to occasional picket firing and artillery duels.
Late in the summer Butler conceived the idea of cutting a
canal across the narrow neck of the peninsula known as Dutch
gap, by means of which the Union gunboats could ascend the
James river without running the fire of the Confederate
batteries. The isthmus was less than half a mile in width and
by the close of the year the canal was completed, except a
bulkhead at the upper end. This was blown up on New Year's
day, but the earth fell back in the canal and the enemy
immediately planted a battery opposite the entrance to the
canal, thus preventing its being opened, and the whole scheme
came to naught.

By the latter part of March, 1865, numerous changes
occurred in the Union army. Hancock had been sent north to
organize a new corps and the 2nd was now commanded by Maj.-
Gen. A. A. Humphreys' the divisions being commanded by Miles,
Barlow and Mott. Cutler's division of the 5th corps was no
longer in existence as a separate organization. The divisions
of the 6th corps were commanded by Wheaton, Getty and Seymour.
After the mine explosion Burnside was, at his own request,
granted leave of absence, the command of the 9th corps being
turned over to Maj.-Gen. John G. Parke. Willcox took command
of the 1st division, Potter of the 2nd and Brig.-Gen. John F.
Hartranft of the 3rd. Sheridan still commanded the cavalry of
the army, the 1st and 3rd divisions, commanded by Devin and
Custer, being known as the Army of the Shenandoah under
command of Gen. Merritt, and the 2nd division was commanded by
Gen. George Crook. Wilson had been sent to Gen. Thomas at
Nashville, Tenn. The Army of the James, Maj.-Gen. E. O. C.
Ord commanding, was composed of the 24th and 25th corps and
some detached troops guarding the defenses of Bermuda Hundred
and the landings along the James. The 24th corps, under Maj.-
Gen. John Gibbon, included the divisions of Foster, Devens and
Turner, and the 25th, Maj.-Gen. Godfrey Weitzel commanding,
consisted of the divisions of Maj.-Gen. August V. Kautz,
Brig.-Gen. William Birney, and the cavalry division under
Brig.-Gen. Ranald S. Mackenzie. On the last day of March the
total strength of the army that was destined to close the war
in Virginia was 114,335 men.

On Feb. 27, 1865, Sheridan, with the two divisions of
cavalry left Winchester and moved up the Shenandoah valley via
Staunton and Charlottesville to within a short distance of
Lynchburg, destroying the James river canal for some distance,
and on March 27, effected a Junction with Grant's army in
front of Petersburg and Richmond. A few days before his
arrival Lee and Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederacy,
held a conference in Richmond, at which it was decided to
abandon the Richmond and Petersburg lines as soon as the
railroads would admit of it, the purpose being to unite Lee's
forces with those of Johnston in North Carolina and attack
Sherman there. Lee knew that Grant was preparing for a
movement against the Danville and South Side railroads and to
counteract this he proposed a sortie against the works on the
east side of Petersburg, which he believed would oblige Grant
to concentrate there, thus thwarting the design on the
railroads and postponing the evacuation until the weather was
more favorable. The point selected for the attack was a
redoubt known as Fort Stedman, about a mile from the
Appomattox and not more than 15O yards from the Confederate
works. This part of the line was held by the 9th corps,
Willcox on the right Potter on the left and Hartranft in
reserve, Fort Stedman being garrisoned by a detachment of the
18th N. Y. heavy artillery under Maj. G. M. Randall. Gordon's
corps was chosen to lead the assault in which he was to be
supported by portions of Hill's and Longstreet's commands. At
this time Lee's army was in desperate straits for food. The
capture of Fort Fisher in January had closed the port of
Wilmington to the Confederacy, thus making it impossible to
obtain supplies from abroad. It had become a common
occurrence for squads of Confederate soldiers, impelled by the
hope of securing better rations, to desert with their arms in
their hands and come over to the Union lines. About 4 a.m. on
March 25 several such squads, claiming to be deserters, left
the enemy's works and when near enough made a dash and
overpowered the Federal pickets. Immediately three strong
columns emerged from the Confederate abatis, one moving
straight on Fort Stedman, one on Battery No 10, a short
distance north of the fort, and the third against Battery No.
11, about the same distance on the south of it. The second
column broke the main line between Batteries 9 and 10 and then
turned toward the fort, taking it on the flank. The garrison
was soon overpowered and the guns of the fort, as well as
those of Battery 10, were turned on Willcox's troops.
Batteries 11 and 12 were quickly captured by the column that
had turned to the right, and for a little while it looked as
though Gordon's attack was to be a complete success. When the
assault was commenced it was so dark that friends and foes
could not be distinguished and the artillery of the other
batteries could not be used. As soon as it was light enough
Gen. McLaughlin, whose brigade occupied the line near Battery
11 opened a mortar fire on the enemy there and soon afterward
carried the battery at the point of the bayonet. He then
entered Fort Stedman, not knowing it was in the hands of the
enemy, and was taken prisoner. Gordon was under the mistaken
impression that there were some forts in the rear of the main
line and the column which captured Battery 10 was moving to
capture these forts when it came in contact with Hartranft's
division, which was coming up to Willcox's support, and was
driven back to the battery and Fort Stedman. Battery 12 was
retaken soon after No. 11, and by 7:30 Parke had driven the
Confederates there into the fort, upon which was concentrated
the fire of several of the Union batteries on the high ground
in the rear. A heavy cross-fire of artillery and infantry was
also brought to bear on the open space between the lines,
rendering it almost impossible for the enemy to return to his
own works or to receive reinforcements. Hartranft then moved
against the enemy in the fort and recaptured the position with
comparatively small loss, capturing 1,949 prisoners, most of
whom had sought shelter in the bomb-proofs, and 9 stands of
colors. Many of the Confederates were killed or wounded by
the murderous cross-fire, while endeavoring to get back to
their own lines. The Union loss was 494 in killed and wounded
and 523 missing. The 2nd and 6th corps were then directed to
make a reconnaissance of the enemy's works in front of Fort
Fisher on the right of Fort Stedman, and to attack if it was
found the force there had been sufficiently weakened to
support Gordon. The intrenched picket line was carried and
the Union troops advanced close to the main works, when it was
found that Hill occupied them with a force too strong to be
assaulted. The enemy tried to recapture the picket line at
several points, but every attack was repulsed. In this affair
the Union loss was about 900 in killed and wounded and 177
missing. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was about
the same and nearly 1,000 were captured.

Grant was now in shape to operate against the railroads
on Lee's right. On April 1 the Confederate forces under Gen.
Pickett were defeated in the battle of Five Forks, and on the
morning of the 2nd the 6th corps broke through the Confederate
lines near Hatcher's run, about 4 miles southwest of
Petersburg. In an attempt to recover the captured line Gen.
A.P. Hill, one of Lee's ablest lieutenants, was killed. The
defeat of Pickett and the breaking of his line determined Lee
to evacuate the Petersburg fortifications before it was too
late, and early on Sunday morning, April 2, he sent the
following despatch to Gen. J. C. Breckenridge, Confederate
secretary of war: "I see no prospect of doing more than
holding our position here till tonight. I am not certain that
I can do that. If I can I shall withdraw tonight north of the
Appomattox, and, if possible, it will be better to withdraw
the whole line tonight from the James river. The brigades on
Hatcher's run are cut off from us; the enemy has broken
through our lines and intercepted between us and them, and
there is no bridge over which they can cross the Appomattox
this side of Goode's or Beaver's, which are not very far from
the Danville railroad. Our only chance, then, of
concentrating our forces is to do so near the Danville
railway, which I shall endeavor to do at once. I advise that
all preparation be made for leaving Richmond tonight. I will
advise you later, according to circumstances."

This despatch-reached Richmond at 10:40 a. m. and was
handed to President Davis while in attendance upon the service
at St. Paul's church. He at once left the church and late in
the day, in company with the officials of the Confederate
States, took a train for Danville. That night the Confederate
army withdrew from Richmond and Petersburg and commenced its
last march, the line of which was up the Appomattox river
toward Amelia Court House. During the winter the people of
Richmond had been kept in ignorance of the real state of
affairs and gave themselves up to pleasures, confidently
expecting to hear any moment of a great Confederate victory.
Lee's despatch, therefore, created consternation among them
and there was a mad rush for the railroad stations in the
desire to leave the doomed city. But transportation was out
of the question, as every available coach and car were loaded
with the officials, attaches and effects of the government,
and to make matters worse orders had been issued that none
should be permitted to board the trains without a pass from
the secretary of war who could nowhere be found. Ewell's
command was the last to leave the city, and scarcely had his
rearguard departed when a fire broke out near the center of
the town and the mob took possession. Stores were broken open
and plundered private residences were robbed and new fires
kindled, until the city was a perfect pandemonium.

At 3 a.m. on the 3rd Parke and Wright discovered that the
enemy had been withdrawn from the trenches in their front, and
upon advancing ascertained that Petersburg was evacuated.
Willcox was ordered to occupy the town with his division,
while the remainder of the 9th, with all of the 6th and 2nd
corps, pushed on after Lee. Weitzel, who commanded the Union
forces on the north side of the James, was informed by Gen.
Devens about 5 o'clock that the Federal pickets had possession
of the enemy's line. Two staff officers, with 40 of the
headquarters, cavalry, were sent forward to receive the
surrender of the city, in case the Confederates had evacuated
it, and soon afterward Weitzel followed with the divisions of
Kautz and Devens. Entering the city by the Osborn pike,
Weitzel rode direct to the city hall, where he received the
formal surrender of the city at 8:15 a.m. For several days
Lieut. J. L. de Peyster, a son of Maj.Gen. J. W. de Peyster,
had carried a United States flag upon the pommel of his
saddle, ready to raise it over the Confederate capitol when
the city should fall into the hands of the Union forces. The
same flag had waved over Butler's headquarters at New Orleans.
Scarcely had the surrender been made before de Peyster, in
company with Capt. Langdon, chief of artillery on Weitzel's
staff, raised this flag over the state house, bringing
Virginia once more under the realm of the Stars and Stripes.

PETERSBURG, VA
FEB. 27TH - MARCH 28TH, 1865

Petersburg Va., Feb. 27-March 28, 1865. Sheridan's
Expedition. On the 27th Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan left
Winchester for an expedition to the front of Petersburg, the
object being the destruction of the Virginia Central railroad,
the James river canal, and the capture of Lynchburg, after
which Sheridan was to join Gen. Sherman's army in North
Carolina or return to Winchester. His forces consisted of the
1st and 3rd cavalry divisions of the Army of the Shenandoah,
respectively commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. C. Devin and Bvt.
Maj.Gen. G. A. Custer; one section of the 2nd and one of the
4th U. S. artillery, and a pontoon train; the total strength
being about 10,000 men. Mount Crawford was reached on March
1, and here about 200 of Rosser's Confederate cavalry were
discovered trying to burn the bridge over the middle fork of
the Shenandoah. Two regiments of Capehart's brigade swam the
river above the bridge charged and routed Rosser, pursuing him
nearly to Staunton, killing a few of his men and capturing 30
prisoners, with 20 wagons and ambulances, Capehart's loss
being 5 men wounded. This caused Gen. Early to retreat from
Staunton to Waynesboro, where he intrenched a position. At
Staunton Sheridan detached a part of his command for the
destruction of some stores at Swoope's station, and pushed on
with the main column, Custer's division in advance, for
Waynesboro. At Fisherville, 6 miles from Staunton, Custer's
advance encountered the enemy's pickets and drove them rapidly
to Waynesboro. Without waiting for the 1st division to come
up, Custer sent the 2nd brigade against Early's position, to
display the force in the works, and directed Lieut.-Col.
Whitaker to take three regiments of Pennington's brigade to
the extreme right. The 1st Conn., 2nd Ohio and 3rd N. J., all
armed with Spencer carbines, were moved to the right and
dismounted under cover of the woods. When they were in
position to attack, Woodruff's section of horse artillery
opened fire with such vigor that the Confederates were
compelled to lie down behind their embankment. Wells and
Capehart moved their brigades to the attack in front, at the
charge, and at the same time the three regiments on the right
caught the enemy on the flank, the whole movement being so
sudden that Early's men were completely routed and fled in all
directions, leaving 11 pieces of artillery, with their horses
and caissons, 200 wagons loaded with subsistence, with their
teams and harness; a large quantity of ammunition; all the
camp equipage and officers, baggage; the headquarters, papers;
16 battle flags and 1,600 prisoners in the hands of the
Federals.

On the 3rd the expedition moved toward Charlottesville,
which place was reached on the 4th, the bridges, depots, etc.,
between Staunton and Charlottesville having been destroyed
during the march. At Charlottesville the command divided, the
1st division moving to Scottsville on the James river, and the
3rd, with the wagon trains, along the Lynchburg railroad,
destroying the bridges and culverts as far as Buffalo river.
The two divisions came together near New Market, where the dam
and locks on the canal were thoroughly destroyed. At
Duguidsville, on the 8th, the Confederates fired on Devin's
division from across the river, but the 5th U. S. cavalry was
dismounted and covered the retirement of the rest of the
division. All the locks on the canal between Goochland and
Duguidsville were destroyed, as well as large stores of
cotton, tobacco and subsistence. Columbia was reached on the
1Oth. where the expedition rested for a day, and on the 12th
the march was resumed toward the Virginia Central railroad,
which was struck at Tolersville on the 13th, and several miles
of track torn up. The next day Custer directed his march
toward Ground Squirrel bridge, while Devin moved along the
railroad to the South Anna. Both bridges were destroyed after
a slight skirmish with the guards, in which the 5th U. S.
cavalry captured a number of prisoners and 3 pieces of
artillery. The 1st division was here ordered to move toward
Hanover Court House and the 3rd to push south as far as
Ashland, but upon learning that a considerable force of the
enemy under Longstreet was moving to intercept the expedition,
the two divisions were united, the whole command recrossed the
South Anna and moved along the north bank of the Pamunkey to
White House landing, which was reached on the 18th. Here the
expedition rested until the 25th, when it again took up the
march and two days later rejoined the Army of the Potomac.
During the movement Sheridan's forces captured 1,603
prisoners, 2,154 horses and mules, 16 battle flags, 17 pieces
of artillery and over 2,000 stands of small arms. The line of
march was marked by wholesale destruction. Sixteen large
mills and factories 26 warehouses and 8 railroad depots,
together with their contents of valuable stores, were laid in
ashes 47 miles of railroad track, 30 miles of telegraph, 49
canal locks, 44 railroad and several wagon bridges, 10
watertanks, and about 40 canal and flatboats all loaded with
provisions, etc., were completely destroyed.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 6

Refine your search of the American Civil War Battle Summaries